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The current power grid is outdated and overwhelmed by the increase in demand
for power. The advent of the smart grid presents a new paradigm that will solve
this problem and also provide several unique functionalities to the consumers. The
smart grid is envisioned to be a completely automated infrastructure that will re-
quire little or no human intervention. This will be made possible due to the in-
tegration of latest information and communications technologies (ICT) into the
power grid. The various sensors installed in the smart grid will have the capa-
bility to report back information related to power consumption, billing and other
significant readings. However, this integration of technology also raises several
concerns about the cyber protection of the smart grid. The security challenges
presented by the smart grid are unique and cannot be overcome with existing so-
xi
lutions. This work presents a novel intrusion detection technique for the smart
grid infrastructure that is capable of detecting malicious activity at different lev-
els of the smart grid hierarchy. In addition signatures of anomalous smart grid
behaviors are formulated to improve detection rate.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Traditional Grid
The main objective of the traditional power grid is to transfer electricity from the
producers (coal plants, hydroelectric dams, etc.,) to the consumers (households
and businesses). It is a centralized model where fixed generation plants supply
consumers through timeworn, unidirectional communication and circulation sys-
tems. Figure 1.1 [2] shows the traditional power grid. The high-voltage wires and
substations that transport electricity over large distances constitute the transmis-
sion system. The distribution structure consists of moderate-voltage wires and
substations that move power in the nearby locations. For long haul transmissions
to substations, step-up transformers are used to enhance the voltage. In addition
the voltage is curtailed when transferring over medium voltage power lines to the
consumer locations. This is realized by applying pole-top transformers. The tra-
ditional grid has failed to cope up with the advances in technology over the years
1
Figure 1.1: Traditional power grid infrastructure.
whereas the demand for power has increased rapidly. The present-day grid with-
out communication is simply a broadcaster of power without any concern about
the power requirement at the consumer end. Therefore, it is imperative that a
two-way communication channel is set-up between the producer and the consumer
to ensure that only the required amount of power is delivered to the consumers.
Communication enables utilities to achieve three key objectives: intelligent mon-
itoring, security, and load balancing [3].
1.2 Smart Grid (SG)
The smart grid is a contemporary electric power grid setup that provides improved
efficiency, reliability and safety, with smooth integration of renewable and alter-
native energy sources, through automated control and modern communications
technologies [4]. This progressive arrangement provides end users with real-time
monitoring and controlling capabilities of energy consumption across the smart
2
communication network. Table 1.1 [1] gives a brief comparison between the tra-
ditional grid and the smart grid features.
Traditional Grid Smart Grid
Electromechanical Digital
One-way communication Two-way communication
Centralized generation Distributed generation
Few sensors Sensors throughout
Manual monitoring Self-monitoring
Manual restoration Self-healing
Failures and blackouts Adaptive and islanding
Limited control Pervasive control
Few customer choices Many customer choices
Table 1.1: Traditional Grid Vs Smart Grid [1].
The combination of contemporary information and communication technologies,
enables the SG to handle a range of situations and events. This implies that the
SG could respond to events that occur anywhere in the grid, such as power gener-
ation, transmission, distribution, and consumption, and adopt the corresponding
response strategies. For example, on detection of a medium voltage transformer
failure in the distribution grid, the SG may automatically adjust the flow of elec-
tricity and recover the power delivery service [1]. In addition, the SG empowers
the consumers to outsource the excess energy that is generated and stored by
them.
3
1.3 Smart Grid expectations
The smart grid is expected to bring with it a number of new technological advances
in addition to addressing the existent issues of the traditional grid. This section
presents some of the outcomes expected from the introduction of the smart grid
and its implications [5].
1.3.1 Support for Various Devices
The smart grid is projected to support a variety of storage and power generation
devices and also enable two-way energy exchange on the present grid. This implies
that in addition to supporting distributed energy resources (DERs) like wind
energy, storage batteries and photovoltaic cells, the smart grid will also facilitate
traditional electric loads, smart devices in households and plug-in electric vehicles
(PEVs). The use of distributed energy resources allows users to gain financial
benefits because they have the choice to retail the surplus energy back to the grid.
The two-way energy exchange mechanism will also alleviate the problem of energy
scarcity at the customer or utility end.
1.3.2 Superior Power Quality
The ability of the supplied electricity on the distribution grid to stick-to the
specified peak levels or root mean square (RMS) voltages is defined as power
quality. The loads involved in the grid are intended to work at definite levels of
electric voltage and frequency and hence cannot tolerate any fluctuation of voltage
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level. On the other hand the affected load can harm the grid affecting customers
residing on the same site. This can even lead to power outages causing revenue
losses. The smart grid overcomes such issues by enhancing the power quality
through monitoring and conditioning. Since electrical devices in the modern world
need significantly higher power quality, a smart grid is able to regulate the power
quality while still maintaining load sensitivity. This provides flexibility in terms
of pricing.
1.3.3 Operation Efficiency and Optimization
The use of computer technology for widespread facility and electrical field equip-
ment checking will enable the smart grid to minimize losses and also to operate
the grid more effectively. The gathered information will ease the maintenance
cycle and will also help in improving the electrical power systems design process.
1.3.4 Grid Security
Since the smart grid will be heavily dependent on the use of an integral com-
munications network for many of its functions such as control and monitoring,
the protection of the infrastructure against cyber or physical attacks is extremely
important. The smart grid must be able to detect as well as segregate any similar
malicious attempts.
5
1.3.5 Grid Self-Correction
The smart grid is estimated to be highly fault tolerant and thus it will be capable of
taking appropriate actions in a timely manner in case of fault detection without the
need for any human involvement. This would make the smart grid highly reliable,
maximize its power quality and productivity and minimize service outage time.
1.3.6 Consumer Participation
The smart grid will enable a greater participation of the consumers due to its
flexible pricing schemes with rates varying according to the load on the grid and
programs like demand response that allow for temporary reduction of load on the
grid. The communications intelligence integrated into the smart grid gives the
end users the option to monitor the health of their individual smart appliances
and supplant the inefficient ones.
1.3.7 Market Boost
The SG will act as a hub for a large number of new consumer services including the
ability to retail and obtain electricity from diverse traders. This will in turn make
the market much more competitive with a large number of electricity suppliers
involved and a variety of options available to the consumers. In addition, the
market vendors will be able to take advantage of variable pricing to manage the
demand of electricity with its availability. The market vendors will need to employ
open standards of communication to ease the process of billing of user data.
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1.4 Smart Grid Domains
The major domains of a smart grid defined by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) include Bulk Generation, Transmission, Distribu-
tion, Customers, Operations, Markets and Service Providers [6, 7].
1.4.1 Bulk Generation
The Bulk Generation domain is responsible for generating electricity in large
amounts using renewable and non-renewable energy sources. The renewable
sources can either be either variable sources (e.g., solar and wind) or non-variable
sources (e.g., hydro, biomass, geothermal and pump storage). The non-renewable
sources include nuclear, coal and gas. The resources used by the Bulk Generation
domain are highlighted in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Bulk Generation domain.
This domain also stores energy for later distribution. The Bulk Generation do-
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main is the most critical component of the smart grid as it is connected to the
Transmission domain and without transmission it would not be possible to serve
the customers [7]. This domain also maintains key performance and quality of
service parameters such as shortage of supply (especially for variable sources)
and generator failure which can be used to route electricity to the Transmission
domain from other sources.
1.4.2 Transmission
The Transmission domain is used to transport electricity over long distances from
from generation sources to distribution through several substations. The main
responsibility of this domain is to maintain consistency on the electric grid by
balancing between generation (supply) with load (demand) across the transmis-
sion network. A transmission network is generally under the control of a Regional
Transmission Operator or Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO) [7].
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1.4.3 Distribution
The Distribution domain (see Figure 1.3) handles allocation of the electricity
sent and received by the end customers in the smart grid. This domain links all
intelligent field devices and the Smart Meters available in the grid.
Figure 1.3: Distribution domain.
The distributuion domain also manages and controls these devices via a bidi-
rectional wireless or wired communications network. It is also possible that the
distribution network may be attached to other energy storage services at the dis-
tribution level.
1.4.4 Customer
The Customer domain of the Smart Grid is responsible for connecting the end-
users of electricity to the electric distribution network through Smart Meters. The
smart meters handle the flow of electricity by the customer and provide usage
9
statistics. Each customer is in charge of a unique area comprised of electricity
premise and bidirectional communications networks. Major functions handled by
this domain are summarized in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Customer domain.
This domain may also generate, store and manage the use of energy, as well as
the connectivity with plug-in vehicles (PEVs).
1.4.5 Operations
The Operations domain (see Figure 1.5) executes and restricts the flow of elec-
tricity from all other domains in the Smart Grid. It performs supervisory tasks
such as monitoring, reporting, controlling and processing of relevant information.
It also establishes a two-way communication channel that links it to substations,
customer premises networks and other intelligent field devices.
10
Figure 1.5: Operations domain.
Business intelligent mechanisms are integrated in this domain to make the decision
making task more accurate. Examples of typical actions performed by the Opera-
tions domain may include: network operation and maintenance, usable reporting
and statistics, fault management, security management and others.
1.4.6 Markets
The task of coordinating and operating all involved parties in Smart Grid is done
by the markets domain. It offers the market organization, wholesaling, retailing
and trading of energy services. It also handles information exchange with third-
parties. Major functions performed by this domain are summarized in Figure 1.6.
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Figure 1.6: Markets domain.
1.4.7 Service Provider
The Service Provider domain is responsible for all third-party related processes
such as energy management related information which are shown in Figure 1.7.
Additional tasks that may be handled by the domain include demand response
programs, outage management and field services.
Figure 1.7: Service Provider domain.
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1.5 Smart Grid Communications Architecture
The Smart Grid infrastructure is known to consist of three network layers: home
area networks (HAN), neighborhood area networks (NAN), and wide area net-
works (WAN) [8]. Each of these layers is composed of several modules or control-
ling systems which may be expanded in the future to incorporate new modules
and systems.
1.5.1 Home Area Networks (HAN)
The HAN is responsible for establishing communication among devices in the
home whereas the HAN gateway communicates with the neighborhood-area net-
work [8]. It provides monitoring and control facilities at customer homes and
implements advanced functionalities like Demand Response (DR) and Automatic
Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The HAN is comprised of the service module
(SM), the metering module (MM), and the meter controlling system (MCS). The
SM is responsible for providing real-time information related to energy consump-
tion and price to the end-users whereas information about energy consumption in
a consumers home is stored by the MM. The MCS accumulates and controls the
information transmitted from SM and MM.
1.5.2 Neighborhood Area Network (NAN)
NAN forms the second layer of the Smart Grid communications infrastructure
and consists of multiple interconnected MCSs of HAN that are in close vicinity
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to each other [8]. In addition to these the NAN also contains: the central access
controller (CAC) and the smart meter data collector (SMDC). The CAC behaves
as the interface that manages the communication between the energy supplier and
HANs. The SMDC handles the metering records of the whole community. One
of the main requirements of NAN is to support mesh networking, as the network
needs to cover thousands of homes, essentially covering over a few square miles.
These networks also have to provide low latencies, typically less than 10 seconds
as control signals are part of the two way communication.
1.5.3 Wide Area Network (WAN)
The WAN constitutes the final layer of the Smart Grid infrastructure and is
responsible for providing communication between the highly scattered smaller area
networks that serve the power systems at different locations [8]. The components
of this layer include the energy distribution system (EDS), the supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) controller, and the energy and service corporations
(E&SC). The EDS handles the distribution of energy and metering data. The
SCADA controller manages the grid elements distribution. The metering and
control information accumulated is then transmitted to the E&SC which makes
advanced decisions on price.
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1.5.4 Supporting Network Technologies for Smart Grid
There are a number of available communication technologies that can be used in
the different components of the Smart Grid. However, there is no single technology
that meets the requirements of all the applications. The following are some of these
technologies:
 Powerline Communication (PLC): Powerline Communication (PLC) lends
its support to the Smart Grid due to its ability to transmit high-speed data
signals between different devices over the existing power lines [9]. In a typi-
cal PLC network, powerlines are used to link Smart Meters to the data con-
centrator through powerlines and cellular network technologies provide the
medium through which data is transferred to the data center. PLCs provide
good coverage but at the cost of poor bandwidth and latency. Therefore,
PLCs are mostly suitable for for in-door environment.
 HomePlug: Another efficient strategy that takes advantage of the existent
electricity infrastructure for communication is called HomePlug [10]. A user
may create a network by either connecting two or more adapters to the power
outlets in the home or the devices may have built-in HomePlug adapter
capabilities. Several versions of HomePlug exist like HomePlug 1.0 which
supports speeds up to 14 Mbps and HomePlug AV that supports speeds up
to 200 Mbps.
 M-Bus: M-Bus (Meter-Bus) [10] is a European standard that allows for re-
mote reading of different types of consumption meters like gas or electricity
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meters. The M-Bus interface is highly cost effective as it supports commu-
nication on two wires. The primary purpose of M-Bus is to facilitate for the
networking and remote reading of utility meters. An application of M-Bus
is the measurement of gas or water consumed by an end user.
 ZigBee: The Zigbee [10] protocol is the preferred communication standard
in the HAN due to its simplicity, mobility, robustness, low bandwidth re-
quirements, low cost of deployment, its operation within an unlicensed spec-
trum and easy network implementation. It supports three types of bands:
868-868.6 MHz with 1 channel for European utilities, 902-928 MHz with 10
channels for North American utilities, and 2.4 GHz with 16 non-overlapping
channels for worldwide utilities. ZigBee enabled Smart Meters can commu-
nicate and control the ZigBee integrated devices. The ZigBee Smart Energy
Profile (SEP) allows user to get real-time information about their energy
consumption. There are several factors that have hindered the widespread
implementation of the Zigbee protocol. These include low processing abil-
ities, limited memory size, strict delay requirements and potential interfer-
ence with other devices, etc.
 Z-Wave: An alternative communication standard to Zigbee is Z-Wave [10].
Z-Wave is a closed standard available only to Zensys customers and uses
the unlicensed 900 MHz ISM (Industry, Scientific and Medical) band. It
supports binary mode operations and can incorporate device related infor-
mation in the communications. On-off states for appliances and raise-lower
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states for thermostat or volume control are examples of supported binary
operations. Z-Wave is known to show good performance even in the presence
of interference from common wireless devices.
The Smart Grid is envisioned to be a completely automated and intelligent setup
that will offer numerous advantages over the existing power grid. The backbone of
such an intelligent system is going to be a a fast, reliable and secure communication
network that interconnects a huge variety of devices distributed throughout its
various domains. The communication architecture developed for the Smart Grid
has to take into account the resource constrained nature of the Smart Grid devices
and the distributed yet integrated nature of its domains.
1.6 Motivation and Objective
The introduction of information and communications technology into the existent
electricity network promises high-end features for the end users in the form of
Smart Grid. Although, the ability of the Smart Grid to cut down on the electricity
utility bill for end-users, is highly praised, it also provides a platform for the
launch of a multitude of malicious attacks through malicious utilization of this
very communication infrastructure. Some of the potential risks faced by the Smart
Grid include [11]:
 Due to greater complexity there is increased risk of accidental errors and
adverse types of attacks.
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 The Smart Grid incorporates a large number of interconnections between
its components which makes the system highly vulnerable to attacks.
 The increasing number of smart nodes exposes a higher number of access
points to the network for launching Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
 A large number of available network links also increases the risk of cascading
failures. A cascading failure occurs when the failure of a single component
(e.g., transmission line failure) triggers the failure of several other compo-
nents and finally the blackout of the grid itself.
However, considering the newness of the technology, vulnerabilities of the Smart
Grid infrastructure (SGI) have not been fully identified. As a result, there is
a lack of quantifiable evidence to clearly identify malicious activity within the
Smart Grid communications, as opposed to routine activity. Due to the nature of
the SGI, contemporary security solutions may not be directly implementable for
protecting the grid from the ever-present threat of malicious attacks.
This work presents a novel intrusion detection technique for the Smart Grid in-
frastructure that is capable of detecting malicious activity at different levels of the
Smart Grid hierarchy. In addition signatures of anomalous Smart Grid behaviors
are formulated to improve detection rate.
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1.7 Research Contribution
The main contributions of this thesis are:
 Attack Pattern Modeling: One attack category that may be identified for
the SGI is the device implant attack, wherein rogue devices may be installed
within a consumers premises so as to report falsified readings to the Smart
Meter. We propose a detection technique through sharing of device reading
information and pattern reconstruction for eventual delivery to the Smart
Meter in a timely manner. We define an optimization criteria to balance a
tradeoff between high frequency of inter-device communication (high over-
head) and accuracy in attack detection. To achieve this multi-objective op-
timization between the two parameters we employ fuzzy based optimization
technique.
 Dataset Modeling for Smart Grid: Research within the field of Smart Grid
is often constrained by the lack of accurate and standard data about cur-
rent system deployments. In this direction, we propose a realistic testbed to
provide a platform where we test our different detection methodologies. We
model the attacks against the home area network of the SGI, through def-
inition and generation of routine device behaviors. Any observed deviation
from the defined normal profile is labeled as a malicious attack.
 Detection of Attacks at HAN Using SVM: We apply the support vector
machine (SVM) approach to create a classication of the SGI data that allows
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to distinguish normal traces from attack traces. SVMs are known to produce
very accurate classifiers and are less prone to the overfitting problem.
 Detection of Attacks at HAN Using SOM: We propose the use of Self Or-
ganizing Maps (SOM), for data clustering, for facilitating classification of
SGI data into either the normal class or the anomalous class. The proposed
approach is subsequently tested for specific parameters and varying training
map sizes.
1.8 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we outline the various threats that the Smart Grid faces and sur-
vey several approaches available in literature for handling these threats. We also
list several machine learning techniques that have the potential to provide novel
solutions for securing the Smart Grid.
In Chapter 3, we present the formulation of the device implant attack in terms
of frequency of inter-device communication and accuracy in attack detection. A
fuzzy-based optimization approach is proposed towards achieving a realistic trade-
off between two parameters: attack detection rate and cost of inter-device commu-
nication. The optimization is expected to provide ideal values for the parameters
that will enable detection of attacks with minimum system overhead. Finally, the
value of the cost ratio is varied to examine its impact on the detection scheme.
In Chapter 4, we model the attack against the home area network of the SGI,
through definition and generation of routine device behaviors. Any observed de-
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viation from the defined normal profile is labeled as a malicious attack. A number
of datasets are generated by varying the percentage of devices in a single record
that contribute towards identifying a data sample as a attack.
In Chapter 5, we study Support Vector Machines for detection of device implant
attacks based on the various datasets modeled in Chapter 4. The detection ac-
curacy of the proposed approach is evaluated in terms of true positives and false
positives.
In Chapter 6, we propose a Self-Organizing Map (SOM)-based approach for data
clustering, for facilitating classification of SGI data into either the normal class or
the anomalous class. A detailed analysis of the proposed is carried out for specific
parameters and varying map sizes.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The advent of the Smart Grid presents a new paradigm that aims to solve many
of the shortcomings of the traditional grid while also providing several unique
functionalities to the consumers. The Smart Grid is envisioned to be a completely
automated infrastructure that will require little or no human intervention. This
will be made possible by the integration of latest information and communications
technologies (ICT) into the power grid. However, this integration of technology
also raises several concerns about the protection of the Smart Grid against cyber-
attacks. In this chapter we provide a brief overview on the topic of network
security and outline various vulnerabilities of the Smart Grid. A survey of the
security measures available in literature is provided and several machine learning
techniques that can be potentially used to develop unique strategies for securing
the Smart Grid are highlighted in this chapter.
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2.1 Network Security
The advent of the internet and improvements in networking technologies over the
years has provided many possibilities for sharing information and interconnecting
different parts of the world. Today the worldwide network hosts data from private
individuals, commercial entities, government organizations and military setups
that require access to their data 24/7. Business organizations have the ability
to quickly and easily share information with their partners, divisions and cus-
tomers internationally. Governments today share information with their citizens
through the internet and have replaced traditional methods with internet-based
information sharing systems. This ease of availability and accessibility of sensitive
information also makes it vulnerable to internet-based cyber-attacks. Attackers
are able to take advantage of of the open source nature of the Internet to carry
out attacks on critical infrastructures while leaving no evidence of their malicious
activities.
Information security is defined as the process of protecting data from unautho-
rized access, use, modification, tempering, or disclosure [12]. When designing a
strategy to secure the network it is important to take into account all aspects of
the network. For instance, just securing the end devices in a network does not
protect the network from cyber-attacks. It is also equally important to secure
the channel of communication between the devices. Hackers could intercept the
exchange of data between devices over a channel, modify it and insert it back into
the channel leading to a security breach. Hence, securing the channel through
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means of encryption techniques is just as important as securing the end devices.
2.1.1 Types of Network Attacks
Without proper security measures in place a network always remains a potential
target for a variety of net work attacks. While there are several types of attacks,
most of them can be classified into the following categories [13]:
 Eavesdropping: This type of attack takes place when an attacker is able
to monitor or listen to traffic in transit. Such attacks are relatively easy
to carry out as TCP/IP being an open architecture sends data in cleartext
format. The attacker only needs to have access to a traffic capture tool in
order to capture the on-going data.
 Data Modification: Once the data has been eavesdropped, it can be easily
modified leading to falsified information. This attack becomes significant
especially in cases where data being transferred includes sensitive informa-
tion like confidential company data and billing information. The attacker
is able to modify the data without the sender gaining any knowledge about
the modification taking place.
 Identity Spoofing (IP Address Spoofing): The Internet is an IP based network
and every host in it is uniquely identified using an IP address. This makes it
possible for an attacker to assume the IP address of a valid entity resulting
in identity spoofing. The attacker is then able to modify, reroute, or delete
data of the original user.
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 Password-Based Attacks: Traditional applications do not always guarantee
the security of user credentials as it travels through the network for verifi-
cation. As such this information can be easily eavesdropped by an attacker.
On obtaining the username and password of the authentic user the attacker
also inherits the access privileges of the user which the attacker can use
to illegally obtain information about legitimate users and computer names,
invalidate network configuration and alter user data.
 Denial-of-Service Attacks: A denial of service refers to an attack that aims
to make an authentic service unavailable to its intended users. This can be
achieved by exhausting all the resources of the target device so that it is
unable to reply to genuine requests or by overloading the network to the
extent that it causes the network to shutdown.
 Compromised-Key Attack: A key is a shared secret code that is used to
interpret secret information that is communicated between two network en-
tities. Although difficult it is not impossible for an attacker to gain access
to this key. The key when with the attacker is known as a compromised key,
which the adversary could use to obtain further keys thereby gaining access
to other secured communications.
 Sniffer Attack: A sniffer is a software tool or device that is able to monitor
and log traffic passing over a digital network. Although sniffers are primarily
meant to be used as troubleshooting tools, they can also be used by attackers
to carry out malicious activities. Sniffers are used by hackers to capture
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packets and extract sensitive information like username and password.
 Application-Layer Attack: An application-layer attack leads to malfunction-
ing of system applications or the operating system running on a server. An
attacker that carries out such an attack has the ability to modify or delete
the operating system, use system resources to create and replicate viruses
several times and disable security controls leading to further attacks.
It is important to note that there is no such thing as a 100% secure network and no
single scheme that ensures one security solution for all scenarios. Different situa-
tions may demand different levels of network security depending on the criticality
of the information being shared through the network.
2.2 Intrusion Detection
In an information and communication technology (ICT) setup, an intrusion is
defined as any attempt to break-in to the system by either an external agent, or by
an unauthorized insider. The process of detecting such malicious activities is called
Intrusion Detection and an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a software or
hardware based tool that monitors network traffic in order to detect such malicious
activities and reports them accurately to the proper authority.
The efficiency of an IDS is evaluated based on the following parameters described
in [14]:
 Accuracy: Accuracy is defined as the ability of an IDS to correctly identify
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intrusions and minimize the number of false alarms. An IDS is tagged as
inaccurate if it wrongly detects a genuine event in the medium as anomalous
or intrusive.
 Performance: The rate at which audit events are analyzed by an IDS is used
to determine its performance. A poorly performing IDS will lack the ability
to detect attacks in real-time.
 Completeness: Completeness is the ability of an IDS to detect all attacks.
On the other hand, incompleteness takes place when an attack is executed
and the intrusion-detection system is unsuccessful in detecting this attack.
 Fault Tolerance: An important requirement for the proper functioning of
an IDS is for the system itself to be resilient to attacks. This is because
majority of the IDSs run on top of commercially accessible operating systems
or hardware, which are easy targets for attacks.
 Timeliness: An intrusion-detection system needs to be able to relay infor-
mation in a timely manner in order to halt further penetration of the attack
and to allow the responsible personnel to take precautionary measures to
prevent the system from being compromised.
Most intrusion detection techniques can be generally classified into one of two
classes, namely, Anomaly Detection and Misuse Detection. Anomaly detection is
based on the principle that an intruders characteristics will significantly vary from
that of a authorized user and thus such behavior could be easily identified. A pre-
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requisite for this approach is to train the intrusion detection scheme with normal
network traffic behaviour patterns. Although, anomaly detection techniques are
capable of detecting both known as well as unknown attacks, they suffer from a
large number of false alarm rates. On the other hand, misuse detection techniques
use pattern matching schemes to match incoming traffic with known patterns of
attacks and classify it as an attack.
IDSs can be additionally divided into host-based IDSs, distributed IDSs, and
network-based IDSs based on the location of knowledge used for classification. A
host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) is defined as a system that monitors
a computer system on which it is installed and is responsible for detecting attacks
against this host only; distributed IDSs are designed to detect attacks in scenarios
involving multiple hosts and thus obtain information from both the hosts and the
network that interconnects these hosts. Finally, Network-based IDSs collect data
from network traffic. Also because the system does not rely on specific attacks
to be trained it is much easier to maintain. Common approaches for intrusion
detection include Statistical Models and Machine Learning Techniques [15].
2.2.1 Statistical Models
Statistical-based systems (SBIDs) work by defining what a normal traffic is and
then classify everything else as anomalous. A SBID system continues to learn
network traffic patterns as long as it is active. The longer a SBID system is
able to last, the more accurate is its classification. The system analyzes network
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traffic and tags every packet with an anomaly score and generates an alert if a
packet score is found to be above a certain threshold. Due to its ability to detect
unknown attacks the SBID system is considered much more efficient than rule
based detection systems. However, because the SBID system is dependent on the
knowledge gained from the regular patterns of network traffic, the system may not
prove to be viable in networks where the traffic is quite diverse and continuously
changing. Another drawback of the system is its learning speed. It may take days
or even weeks to gain an acceptable level detection accuracy.
In [16], statistical models were applied for detecting novel attacks against net-
works. In the proposed work network activity models were used to detect denial
of service and probe attacks. The KolmogorovSmirnov test was used for applica-
tion models to prove the statistical difference between normal and attack telnet
connections in the DARPA dataset.
In [17], Wang et al. used the difference between the number of SYN and FIN pack-
ets, which was modeled as a stationary random process, to detect SYN flooding
attacks. The authors then used the CUSUM algorithm to look for a change-point
in the time series corresponding to the sum of received SYN packets and thus
detect the SYN flooding attacks. The drawback of such an approach is that an
alarm can be set off only when there is a significant change in the aggregated
series.
An anomaly detection technique based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
was proposed in [18]. In the proposed approach, normal traffic behavior is rep-
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resented by k-subspace achieved through PCA and anomalies are denoted by the
outstanding (n − k) subspace. The method proposed claims inferior false alarm
rates along with network-wide anomaly detection.
2.2.2 Machine Learning Techniques
A primary shortcoming of signature based intrusion detection techniques is
their inability to adapt to new intrusion types. The signature database needs
to be manually updated for every new intrusion discovered. Even if an attack
is discovered and its signature is used to develop a detection prototype, the
system would become obsolete by the time it comes into production. These
limitations have led to an increased interest in the field of using data mining for
intrusion detection. Data mining (also known as Knowledge Discovery) is the
process of locating beneficial and recently unknown patterns in large volumes
of information. Data mining techniques can be demarcated in terms of their
model functions and representation, preference criterion, and algorithms [19].
The field of machine learning is a subset of data mining which is concerned
with the development of intelligent algorithms that learn autonomously through
experience. Examples of such algorithms include data mining programs that
discover general rules in large data sets and information filtering systems that
automatically learn users interests [15]. Machine learning techniques can be
classified into two types, namely, supervised and unsupervised machine learning
algorithms [20]. The aim of supervised learning algorithms is to assign labels to
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unknown samples using knowledge gained from the training phase where labeled
feature vectors are used as input for training. In contrast, unsupervised learning
schemes are trained using unlabeled samples. Common data mining techniques
[15] that have been used for intrusion detection are presented in this section.
Inductive Rule Generation
The RIPPER System is probably the most popular technique representing this
class. RIPPER [21] is a fast rule learning technique that generates concise rule
sets. The system uses a set of rules and patterns that can prove realistic for
classification for network traffic. The rule set generated by the system is simple
and allows multiple rule sets to be created and used with a meta-classifier.
Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithm (GA) is a Artificial Intelligence (AI) based search technique
that is inspired from the principles of evolution and natural selection [22]. The
concept of GAs was first initiated by John Holland and his aides in the early
1970s. In computer security applications, it is mainly used for finding optimal
solutions to a specific problem. The algorithm usually begins with a group of
chromosomes that is arbitrarily selected and is used to characterize the problem
to be resolved. A chromosome is represented using either bits, characters, or
numbers. A fitness function is used to select chromosomes with superior fitness
values that results in a improved solution. To determine the fitness level of
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a chromosome an evaluation function is employed. The natural processes of
reproduction and mutation of species during the evaluation phase are simulated
using two intrinsic operators, namely, mutation and crossover. In the mutation
process, the value of a given gene is randomly changed from its current state to
a completely new one. The crossover method proceeds through the combination
of two parent chromosomes that produces two descendant chromosomes. The
combination of chromosomes may take place in one of two ways:
 The two parents are duplicated unaltered as offspring.
 The two parents are randomly joined to create offspring.
GA or GP based systems exhibit superior performance when compared to other
systems because they can be easily trained multiple times. The best population
obtained from the previous iteration can be simply used as initial population for
the next loop. However, the operations this time are performed on new data.
This implies that the entire process is inherently flexible.
Bankovic et al. [23] proposed a intrusion detection system that is based on the
serial combination of two genetic algorithms and promises low computational
overhead. The first IDS simply behaves as a linear classifier that separates
normal instances from possible attacks. To minimize the high number of
false-positives produced from the first IDS, a second system based on if-then
rules is implemented that refines the output from the first stage. Incremental
genetic algorithms are used to train both the systems. For linear classification,
every chromosome in the population is composed of four genes. The first three
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chromosomes represent the coefficients of the linear classifier and the fourth one
signifies the threshold value. Alternatively, each rule in the rule-based system is
represented by a 3-gene chromosome and the population size used here is much
smaller than that chosen for the first system. The use of two different system
enables each system to be trained independently of the other.
The fitness function in Genetic Algorithm is used to determine the fit chromo-
somes that define the next generation population through the crossover and
mutation processes. Alim Al Islam et al. [24] recommended a fitness function
that is based on the accuracy-existence-occurrence structure. A higher accuracy
factor points to a strong rule to detect theft whereas a higher value of existence
indicates that the rule matches more in the dataset. The value of existence
is only needed for random selection from the population while both accuracy
factor and the occurrence are to be included in the fitness function. The authors
propose the use of accuracy factor and occurrence in a weighted form. A highly
secured network demands a higher weight for accuracy and a faster security
implementation implies a higher weight for occurrence.
An intrusion detection system called ID-SOMGA was proposed by Folorunso
et al. in [25] which is composed of of two other algorithms: Self Organizing
Migrating Algorithm (SOMA) and Genetic Algorithm (GA). The resultant hybrid
algorithm is able to tackle small as well as large population sizes. SOMGA is
used to design rules that can detect attack instances only. The obtained rules
are tried on historical connections and are later used to identify suspect network
33
traffic during future network traffic scans. If a rule is successful in identifying
an anomalous connection, a bonus point is awarded to it and a penalty is likely
otherwise. As compared to an IDS with GA, the proposed approach display
much slower performance but provides a very small ratio of false positive rate.
Another approach that utilizes genetic algorithm for intrusion detection was
presented in [26]. In the proposed approach normal instances are distinguished
from anomalous instances based on simple rules derived from network traffic.
Theses rules are typically formulated in form of if (condition) then (act). The
condition is used to represent a match between current network connection and
the rules in IDS and the act defines the actions to be performed which may
include include reporting of alerts to system supervisor or blocking the connection
attempt.
Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy Logic was first introduced in 1965 by Lotfi A. Zadeh, professor for
computer science at the University of California in Berkeley [27]. Fuzzy Logic
(FL) is a multi-valued logic that is used to define in the middle values like yes/no,
true/false etc. A fuzzy set forms the basic building block of fuzzy logic and is
considered to be an improvement over the mathematical set. For example the
temperature a cup of tea is known to fall in the range of 0 to 100 degree Celsius.
A cup of tea with temperature 70 degrees is considered hot (1) and a cup of
tea with a temperature of 20 degrees is considered cold (0) and therefore the
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decision in both these cases is definite. However, a cup with a temperature of
50 degrees might be considered hot by some while others might take it to cold.
This uncertainty in classification is referred to as fuzziness. A fuzzy set enables
such classifications to be successfully carried out. Fuzzy logic readily extends it
support to the field of intrusion detection as it helps in overcoming the fuzziness
in differentiating between normal and anomalous events. The elimination of
insignificant inputs results in a much simpler problem and also provides gains in
speed and classification accuracy.
In [28], the authors proposed the integration of fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms
for intrusion detection. Fuzzy logic is used to include quantitative parameters in
intrusion detection, whereas genetic algorithm is used to find best fit parameters
of introduced numerical fuzzy function. Another work in this direction was
investigated in [29]. The fuzzy sets in this approach are normalized to fit within
the boundary of 0.0 to 1.0. The genetic algorithm is used to create rules for both
normal and anomalous behavior. Rules are represented as complete expression
tree and the tree structure is used to represent and classify data. This approach
of integration has however not proven to be very effective against port scans.
Abadeh et al [30] tried to improve fuzzy rules by using local search operators
to search their neighborhood. Instead of generating the initial population
randomly, a training data sample is randomly selected, and the most compatible
combinations of antecedent fuzzy sets is determined. A heuristic method is used
to determine the consequent part. If the consequent part confirms the class label
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of data samples the rule is kept else the the generation process is repeated again.
Neural Networks
An artificial neural network (ANN), also popularly known as neural networks, is
a computational mode inspired by biological neural systems. A neural network
consists of a huge number of highly interconnected neurons that collaborate with
each other towards solving a categorical problem. Each neuron is made up of a
summing element and an activation function. The output from each neuron is in
turn used as input to all the next layer neurons.
A back propagation neural network was proposed by Ghosh et al. in [31]. The
performance of the introduced neural network was found to be equivalent to that
of a basic signature matching system. The Base Security Module (BSM) is used
to create the training set out of the captured strings of events. The proposed
neural network behaves as an anomaly detector if the training set is composed of
strings pertaining to normal behavior and as a misuse detection module if the
strings correspond to attack scenarios.
Ryan et al. [32] defined a contemporary detection method using neural networks
that provides off-line anomaly detection. The Neural Network Intrusion Detec-
tion (NNID) anomaly detection system exploits the distribution of commands
performed by a user to identify him/her as a genuine user. Upon collection of
data, training is implemented using a back propagation neural network and each
user is identified based on the training data. A user is tagged as anomalous if the
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neural network places low confidence in its decision. A maximum activation value
of below 0.5 is an indication of an anomaly. In another approach [33], the two
class problem of classifying normal and attack instances was resolved using three
and four layer neural networks. Based on experiments conducted a classification
accuracy of above 99% was reported.
Michailidis et al. [34] employed PSO to optimize the weights of multilayer
perceptrons (MLPs). The principle used to evolve the weights is similar to
the one used by genetic algorithms. The proposed algorithm is tested on a
small (under-sampled) subset of the KDD Cup 99 data set. Their findings
are comparable to other applications of MLPs. Their approach detects more
Probing and U2R attacks, but at the expense of a higher FPR. However, it is not
understood whether this due to the use of PSO to train the MLPs, or due to the
under-sampling.
Support Vector Machine
A Support vector machine (SVM)is a binary classification algorithm that that
plots the training vectors in high dimensional feature space, separating the set
of training vectors into two separate classes. The training samples close to a
decision boundary constitute the support vectors. The SVM also enables users
to balance between the number of misclassified samples and the width of a
decision boundary through a parameter called penalty factor. Although, SVMs
are capable of achieving a high detection rate, they also give rise to a high false
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positive rate. To address this issue Tian et al [35] proposed a new technique for
anomaly detection that combines One-Class SVMs and PSO techniques. The
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve evaluates parameters selection,
the area under the ROC curve (AUC) represents the fitness of each particle and
the PSO algorithm is used to search the global ideal SVM parameters. This
technique achieves a high true positive rate (TPR) with a low false positive rate
(FPR).
Ma et al. [36] proposed a hybrid algorithm that combines binary particle swarm
optimization (BPSO) and support vector machine (SVM). To optimize the
dataset feature selection and SVM parameters optimization, the linearly decreas-
ing weight strategy and random mutation are employed to update velocities in
BPSO. The task of SVM in the setup is to differentiate between normal and
anomalous behavior. The modified BPSO is used to obtain the best particle
position quickly throughout the search space, which cooperates with SVM for
evaluating the fitness of the corresponding particle. This combined approach
allows for the selection of optimum features and parameters at the same time.
In [37], a time-based inductive machine (TIM) was proposed that is able to
provide information about a users behavior pattern. One general application
of the TIM is discovery of patterns in a sequence of events that are temporally
correlated. A logical interpretation mechanism called inductive generalization is
used to generate and modify rules which are derived from the temporal patterns.
In the scope of intrusion detection, the scheme is used to predict the next event
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based on information gathered about a sequence of events. Here, rules represent
the behavioral patterns of a group of users or a single user.
Immunological Based Techniques
The computer immunological approach [38] is inspired from the immune systems
ability of differentiating between self and non-self. Both self and non-self are
represented as strings of length l in this system. Any string of length l that does
not match any string belonging to the pool of self-strings is considered as non-self.
The differentiation process consists of generating a random string of length l and
then checking if there is a matching string for it in the pool of self-strings. On
successful match, the string is discarded; else it is marked as a detector. This is
a simple approach but has high time complexity which increases exponentially
with the number of self-strings.
The artificial immune system (AIS) proposed by Kephart [39] is the first attempt
towards emulating the human immune system (HIS) for intrusion detection.
The main objective of the proposed approach is the the automatic detection of
computer viruses and worms. The viruses are initially detected by the system
using either fuzzy matching or through the use of integrity monitors. While
fuzzy logic is used for pattern matching with available signatures of viruses,
an integrity monitor is used to report any changes in key system binaries and
data files. In order to confirm the identification of a program as a virus and to
reduce the number false positives, a set of dummy programs are maintained in
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the system whose main objective is to get infected. If any such dummy program
gets infected, it is an indication that the detected program is indeed a virus.
Consequently, signatures of the virus from the infected program are extracted
and communicated with the neighbouring systems. In addition the infected
binaries are cleaned and returned to the original state.
Clustering Techniques
Clustering is the categorization of related entities into different sets. In the
context of a dataset, clustering is defined as the splitting of the dataset into
subgroups or clusters such that records in each subgroup are related to each
other in some way. The applications of data clustering are many including data
mining, image analysis, pattern recognition and machine learning. In particular,
clustering finds its use in the field of intrusion detection due to the need for
clustering anomalous actions together thereby separating it from legitimate data.
The clustering approach is known to be superior to other classification techniques
as it does not require the use of a labeled data set for training.
A self-organizing map (SOM) or self-organizing feature map (SOFM) is a data
visualization system that decreases the magnitudes of data through the use of
self-organizing neural networks. It was proposed by Professor Teuvo Kohonen
of the Neural Networks Research Center (Helsinki University of Technology,
Finland) in the early 1980s. Major components of a SOM include the sample
data, the vector weight and the training algorithm. The vector weight is itself
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composed of two parts: 1. its data, and 2. its natural location. The SOM is
a unsupervised learning method, which implies that no human interference is
required during the learning process and that little knowledge is required about
the features of the input data. An input vector is presented to the SOM network
of neurons and a single neuron is determined as a winning neuron based on its
similarity to the input vector. The weight of the winning neuron is updated to
make it more closer to the input vector. A SOM represents the input space of
the training samples in a 1 or 2-dimension map. At the end of the SOM training
process similar data items are grouped together that enables data visualization.
SOM was used by Lichodzijewski et al. [40] to develop a host-based intrusion
detection system that attempts to makes the process of intrusion detection
completely autonomous. The proposed system uses pattern discovery to model
the behavior of a common user. A two level SOM architecture is used where
the first level is composed of three maps and the second level is represented
by one network. Each of the three maps in the first level is used to signify a
single feature, the first map models the location from which the connection is
established, the second map represents the user account which is used to execute
the log-in process and the final map imitates the connection type. In general,
the first level is used to summarize the features in the three input domains with
respect to time. The second level gathers input from the first level and merges
the values received from the three different maps at level one to provide an overall
report on user activity. This outcome is then used by the network manager to
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classify a particular session as either normal or anomalous.
In order to handle the vast amount of alerts generated by IDS devices Lifen et .al
[41] proposed a Self-Organizing Map (SOM) based hybrid alert clustering method
that also incorporates particle swarm optimization (PSO). Binary particle swarm
optimization (BPSO) and mutual information (MI) are used for selection of
relevant features, while SOM is employed to cluster the dataset. PSO is used
to evolve the weights for S0M to improve the clustering result. The proposed
scheme when compared with the canonical SOM model for the 2000 DARPA
dataset, achieves a higher clustering accuracy rate for the connection records
which represent DOS, Probing and normal records respectively.
2.3 Security Implications of Smart Grid
It is generally convenient to presume that emerging problems can be easily over-
come using existing approaches. Unfortunately, this approach has not always
proven to be fruitful in the past due to the unique challenges posed by new do-
mains. The Smart Grid replacing the its highly acknowledged and dependable
traditional grid, presents a number of new security challenges, in addition to
other existing ones, that necessitate innovative methodologies to the field of cyber
security.
The Smart Grid is composed of a variety of small, resource-constrained devices
such as Smart Meters, sensors and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) devices that are hampered by limited battery and processing power.
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As such it is vital to design security solutions for the Smart Grid that take into
consideration these constraints.
Price information, meter data, and control commands constitute the major por-
tion of the information exchanged between heterogeneous devices of the Smart
Grid. As such any security scheme designed for the Smart Grid needs to ensure
at minimum the following [42]:
 Confidentiality of Power Usage: Lack of security measures for meter data
can lead to leakage of information about the usage patterns for individual
appliances. This loophole can be exploited by intruders simply by monitor-
ing the appliances.
 Integrity of Data, Commands, and Software: It is important to safeguard the
integrity of price information as incorrect low prices inserted by an attacker
can result in a sudden jump in the utilization of electricity. This is because
several appliances would concurrently switch on to take advantage of this
newly advertised low price. In addition, integrity of software is important
because infected software can compromise different grid components.
 Availability Against DoS/DDoS Attacks: Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
aim to make resources unavailable to their legitimate users and can lead
to resource exhaustion by sending fabricated requests to a server, and dis-
tributed DoS (DDoS) attacks deny access to authentic users from using a
specified network resource like Smart Meter and appliances.
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2.4 Vulnerable Smart Grid Domains
The Smart Grid is a combination of several complex components each of which op-
erates in harmony with the others. Therefore, compromise of any one component
can lead to the disruption of the entire Smart Grid. Major security vulnerabili-
ties for the Smart Grid can be generally categorized into one of the the following
categories [43]:
 PCS Security
 Smart Meter Security
 Power System State Estimation Security
 Smart Grid Communication Protocol Security
2.4.1 PCS Security
Process Control Systems (PCS) are employed by the Smart Grid to monitor and
control physical aspects of the electrical power grid. PCSs were traditionally de-
signed to run in isolated environments and hence did not necessitate any built-in
security measures. However, the large scale nature of the Smart Grid implies that
these PCSs if used without modification will create multiple entry points into the
network which can potentially be used to execute malicious actions. There are a
variety of PCSs. The most widely known PCS for the electrical power grid is the
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that can support different PCSs was pro-
44
posed by Valdes and Cheung in [44]. Although most PCSs had no security mea-
sures designed to handle security breaches, they were still being used in corporate
networks in practice. This posed security threats because PCSs could now be
manipulated by outside connections through the corporate domain. The motives
behind attacking the PCS could range from causing financial loss or damage to
expensive equipment to causing physical injuries. Since the PCS configuration is
known to remain static and the traffic flow through it can be easily modeled, a
model-based IDS was suggested for intrusion detection. In addition to the model-
based approach, a signature-based approach is used in order to detect known
attacks.
Jiaxi et. al. [45] contributed two different cyber security assessment methods that
allow the level of cyber security risk of a system to be defined. The two meth-
ods are: probabilistic assessment and an integrated approach. The probabilistic
assessment approach assigns a vulnerability index to the cyber systems based on
the combined probability of occurrence of an incident and the probability of a
resulting incident. In the integrated approach the extremity of security risks is
used to classify them into one of five different classes. The degree of cyber security
risk is determined using the obtained probabilities and a formula.
2.4.2 Smart Meter Security
A Smart Meter is generally a electrical meter that is installed at customer premises
and is used to provide real-time energy consumption information to the customers.
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The captured energy consumption information is communicated by Smart Meter
to the energy suppliers. Smart Meters also allow for a much more advanced model-
ing of the power usage requirements as compared to the traditional power meters.
It is important to secure the Smart Meters as falsified readings sent from the
Smart Meter to the supplier can result in improper billing, and fabricated power
usage approximations. Because Smart Meters are typically installed at consumer
locations they are within easy reach of malicious users who may attack the Smart
Meter either for monetary gains or to cause financial loss to the legitimate end-
user. Integrity and confidentiality are the two most important security objectives
in this domain as it is important to maintain the correctness of Smart Meter read-
ings.
A scheme for compressed meter reading in Smart Grid was proposed by Li et. al.
in [46]. The compressed meter reading concept is unique as it enables the access
point to differentiate the reports from a number of simultaneously transmitting
Smart Meters. When compared to the carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) tech-
nique, the simultaneous access technique provides relatively uniform delays. The
use of a random sequence in the compressed sensing provides a higher level of
privacy and integrity of the meter reading.
In [47], a privacy preserving protocol using zero knowledge proof for Smart Meters
was proposed. The zero knowledge proof is used to ensure the correctness of the
bill without disclosing any details about the consumption data.
A specification based IDS that performs real time screening of the traffic between
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meters and access points at different layers of the OSI model was proposed in
[48]. To ensure proper operation of the system in scenarios of malicious meters
and DoS (Denial of Service) attacks the authors define a set of four monitoring
rules. The formulated rules are tested in a realistic AMI environment and a formal
verification of the specifications and monitoring operations is carried out at the
application layer.
To verify the correctness and accuracy of Smart Meter measurements an echo
method was suggested in [49]. The proposed method allows energy suppliers to
echo the power readings they receive from Smart Meters back to the customers.
These data echoes can in turn be used by the end-users to confirm the integrity of
the Smart Meter measurements. The work in [49] provided a encryption method
for encoding the data echoes. The encrypted readings could only be decrypted
using the original Smart Meter readings. If an echoed reading cannot be decoded
with the original reading then this meant the two readings are distinct.
An approach to handle intrusion threats aimed at the advanced metering infras-
tructure (AMI) was presented in [50]. The authors proposed the use of specifi-
cation based IDS as it offers better accuracy when compared to signature-based
IDS. In addition specification based systems do not need experimental data to
sense intrusions and due to limited number of protocols implemented by Smart
Meters would prove to be highly beneficial for ensuring the Smart Grid environ-
ment. However, such systems introduce significant overhead and are also costly
to implement.
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2.4.3 Power System State Estimation Security
In order to maintain the stability of the the electrical power grid, the Smart Grid
is required to control the physical properties of the electrical power system. To
achieve this the Smart Grid must model the current state of the power system so
that it can make informed decisions and take appropriate actions on them. The
state estimation model is considered to be a part of the PCS. Thus it is important
that the security objectives that are defined for PCSs are also applied to state
estimation system. The power system state estimation model is a tool used by
the Smart Grid PCSs to model sensor and agent data.
The contribution of the work in [51] shows the impacts of performing a false-data
injection attack on the Smart Grid. The impact of the attack is measured in
terms of monetary gain by manipulating pricing of the electrical market. The
work also shows that it is possible to perform this attack without being detected.
The attacker does need to know the pricing model that is being used by the system
to carry out this attack successfully.
A light-weighted pattern matching scheme for detection of attacks in the Smart
Grid was proposed in [52]. A number of malicious attacks specific to the Smart
Grid are identified that include:
 Consumer Device Implant Attacks: Any attack where a fake device im-
planted in the Smart Grid infrastructure is identified as a legitimate device
by the system.
 Meter Implant Attacks: The purpose of this attack is to place a hoax meter
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with malicious software to alter meter reading resulting in either a increase
or a reduction of billing amount for the consumer.
 Black Hole Attacks: A black hole attack occurs in the network when a
data concentrator halts forwarding of all meter readings to their rightful
destinations i.e., control centers.
 Malicious Hand-held Terminals: The transfer of viruses from handheld de-
vices to smart components such as Smart Meters and concentrators can
cause considerable disruption to normal operations of the Smart Grid.
The graph neuron (GN) algorithm is utilized to identify malicious or misbehav-
ing devices in the network and to take appropriate actions which may include
replacement of the infected device. Two pre-defined thresholds are used to clas-
sify a device as a malicious one: Upper threshold (UT) and lower threshold (LT).
UT is the maximum generated reading by a device and LT is the minimum. Any
observed reading for a device that does not fall under the boundary [LT, UT] is
concluded to be generated from an infected device.
2.4.4 Smart Grid Communication Protocol Security
The Smart Grid is a combination of different communication environments each
of which introduces its own protocol and security requirements to meet the multi-
dimensional nature of the resultant communication infrastructure. Examples of
these requirements include performance parameters like very low latency and high
data throughput. Because the Smart Grid is completely dependent on its commu-
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nication infrastructure to ensure its smooth functioning, it is imperative to design
robust security measures for the Smart Grid communication protocols. Many of
the major Smart Grid functionalities are rendered useless if no communication is
available.
A set of design principles for creating authentication protocols in the Smart Grid
was proposed in [53]. These design principles were created by altering the Internet-
based principles to achieve stronger security objectives that are relevant to the
Smart Grid. Zhang and Gunter [54] proposed a secure multi-cast protocol that
can be used for communication in the Smart Grid. The objective behind using
multi-cast is its ability to utilize bandwidth more efficiently. The proposed secure
multi-cast communication protocol is unique because it is able to automatically
determine group membership. Group membership can be automatically deter-
mined as the protocol is application-aware. The communication protocol was
implemented using IPSec as it achieves low latency for medium sized networks.
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CHAPTER 3
FUZZY-BASED
OPTIMIZATION FOR
EFFECTIVE DETECTION OF
SMART GRID
CYBER-ATTACKS
In this chapter, we propose a pattern matching technique, wherein the smart
devices of a consumers household of a home area network exchange personal elec-
tricity consumption readings with each other through a structured hierarchy, at
fixed intervals of time. We have formulated an equation to balance the tradeoff
between the frequency of inter-device communication and accuracy in attack de-
tection in the presence of a variable number of implanted devices. We present
51
a fuzzy logic-based optimization approach towards achieving a realistic tradeoff
between attack detection rate and cost of inter-device communication. The reason
to introduce fuzzy logic for detection of attack is that security for smart grid itself
includes fuzziness. Device implant attacks occur when a device is either implanted
within the home area network to generate fictitious readings for delivery to the
smart meter, or to forbear from actual communication with the smart meter.
Hoax devices implanted within the vicinity of a home area network (HAN) are
capable of generating malicious electricity utilization data for subsequent delivery
to the smart meter, thereby resulting in incorrect electricity usage bill for a client.
The Werners Fuzzy operator [55] is applied to find the optimal balance between
frequent communication of attack detector nodes for detecting smart grid attacks
when the formulation for attack detection proposed is implemented, and the actual
accuracy in attack detection. The resulting values of system parameters obtained
through the fuzzy-based formulation have been analyzed subsequently.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents an overview
of the device implant attack. The attack detection scheme and the system pa-
rameters involved thereof are described in Section 3.2. A summary of the fuzzy
based optimization is presented in Section 3.3. We present our simulation results
and analysis in Section 3.4.
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3.1 Device Implant Attack
The ability of smart grid to minimize the electricity utility bill for end-users is one
of its main advantages and is highly praised. However, this very communication
infrastructure also can act as a platform from which a large number of malicious
attacks can be launched. Although, many malicious attacks have been identified
in the literature, with the capability of disrupting the smooth functioning of the
smart grid setup, the newness of the technology has meant that not all vulnerabil-
ities of the SGI have been discovered yet. As a result, there is a lack of substantial
proof to clearly identify malicious activity within the smart grid communications,
as opposed to routine activity. However, due to readily available hacking tools, a
malicious activities can be easily executed against any online resource that is part
of the Internet.
A consumer device implant attack is defined as an attack by a malicious user
wherein a malicious device is installed within the SGI home area network for the
following purposes:
 To generate fictitious readings for delivery to the smart meter, and
 To emulate an existing device operational in the network, and abstain from
actual communication with the smart meter [52].
Such an attack is generally initiated through the implantation of one or several
hoax consumer devices within a particular home area network. These implanted
devices will generate falsified data for subsequent delivery to the smart meter. The
motives behind such an attack may be to cause financial harm to the legitimate
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end-user by increasing his electricity usage bill beyond the actual figure or the
attack may be carried out the end-user himself to reduce his electricity bill. The
user in the latter case will try to benefit through a less-than average electricity
bill to be settled at the end of the month.
3.2 Attack Detection Scheme
In the absence of shared secret keys or the public key infrastructure to provide
secure communication both between the consumer devices as well as between the
devices and the smart meters, the confidentiality of any information exchange
within the smart grid infrastructure is not achievable. As a result, such an at-
tack can affect the confidence of consumers on a particular service provider, or
may affect the profitability of the provider incurred through incorrectly reduced
electricity bills.
3.2.1 Steps for Attack Detection
The proposed technique is based upon distributed definition and confirmation
of SGI device readings through a predefined communication pathway for each
device. Each device i in the home area network is programmed to communicate
with exactly two other devices in the network, in close proximity to device i. As
illustrated in Figure 3.1, the legitimate SGI devices of the home area network are
programmed to communicate with exactly two other neighboring SGI devices, to
exchange their respective power consumption readings, at fixed intervals of time.
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In addition, rogue devices that are implanted into the network will try to disrupt
such communication through their individual attempts to transmit falsified device
readings to the smart meter.
Figure 3.1: The proposed device implant attack detection scheme.
We model the device readings as subpatterns, and we refer to this regular exchange
of device readings as pattern exchange. At the end of the pattern exchange process
during a given time frame of length L, see Figure 3.2, each device will consist of a
3-tuple comprising of its personal device reading (readingt
i
), and two neighboring
device readings = (readingt
i−1, reading
t
i+1).
Figure 3.2: Smart devices communicate at regular intervals.
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Following is the sequence of steps that outline the attack detection scheme:
 Initialization: During this phase, which is executed only once at time of
network initialization, all SGI devices operational within a home area net-
work are pre-configured with addresses of two other devices in their close
vicinity. As a result, a device i will form a communication link with devices
i - 1 and i + 1, respectively. In addition, based on selected parameters of
the scheme, namely, values of N , γ, CC , and CC , and Equation 3.3, the time
window length L, is fixed. This time window length defines the frequency
of inter-device communication required for attaining a high degree of accu-
racy in attack detection, imposing minimal resource overhead in terms of
communication delays, imposed. An alternating communication parameter
(Alternating Sequence(i)) is configured within each device. This parameter
essentially restricts the device from communication during Phase 3 below
in any two consecutive time windows. The purpose of such practice is to
cut-down the communication overhead both in terms of resource usage as
well as delays incurred by the scheme in half.
 Pattern Exchange: As part of the detection scheme execution, individual
devices record their electricity usage at the end of every time window, and
communicate their readings with their two respective peer devices. As a
result, a 3-tuple reading is stored within each device at the end of a given
time window.
 Smart Meter Communication: During this phase of execution, the pattern
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tuples of electricity usage reconstructed within each SGI device are commu-
nicated, in alternate manner, with the smart meter. The alternating criteria
is based on skipping alternate time windows, so as to ensure that individ-
ual SGI devices do not communicate with the smart meter, to share their
reconstructed patterns, in any two consecutive intervals of time.
 Attack Identification: When a smart meter receives the 3-tuple device read-
ings from N
2
devices at the end of each window of time, these readings are
considered genuine and stored. An attack is identified if multiple device
readings are received for the same SGI device within a given frame of time.
Such a scenario alludes towards the presence of implanted devices attempt-
ing to disrupt SGI operations through communication of incorrect device
readings to the smart meter. In such scenarios, the device with multiple
reported readings is identified and the consumer is appropriately informed
to take necessary mitigation action.
The first step towards securing the smart grid infrastructure is through the
detection of the malicious attack. In particular, device implant attacks require
that the detection scheme be able to identify the misbehaving devices of the
network in a timely and accurate manner, so as to be able to mitigate the effects
of the attack, upon successful detection. Identification of patterns of routine SGI
device readings by the smart meter is one such approach towards confirming
routine network activity. On the contrary, a misbehaving device attempting
to convey incorrect readings to the smart meter will be identified through the
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reconstruction of the patterns exchanged between alternating SGI devices and
the smart meter. The readings of individual devices of a given home area network
constitute the information that must be verified for correctness. In Figure 3.3, we
provide a sequence of steps executed by the proposed scheme, for device implant
attack detection.
Figure 3.3: The proposed attack detection scheme.
3.2.2 Optimal Parameter Selection
Following is a list of parameters of the proposed device implant detection scheme:
 F is the frequency of communication between the SGI devices for pattern
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exchange and reconstruction,
 CI is defined as the cost (overhead) imposed on the home area network
through incorrect device reading verification,
 CC is defined as the cost of operating a device implant attack detection
scheme, through added messages exchanged,
 N is the overall number of devices active in the network,
 γ is defined as an estimate on the number of implanted devices within the
network.
The frequency of inter-device communication for pattern exchange and recon-
struction at the end of each interval of time of length L, is defined through the
parameter F . Selecting higher values of this parameter implies that the scheme
requires frequent exchange of device readings. In other words, a higher value of F
will imply a shorter time window length L, where the value of L is lower bound by
the minimal time required for a home area network with N devices to successfully
execute the pattern exchange process. On the contrary, selecting smaller values
of F will lead to less frequent exchange of device readings, and less frequent re-
construction of patterns, for delivery to the smart meter. As a result, the timely
detection of an attack may be affected. Through Equation 3.1, an elaboration on
the total cost associated with the proposed device implant detection scheme is
provided.
TotalCost(C) =
γCI
F
+
FCC
N
(3.1)
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As the network size N increases, the frequency of inter-device communication F
will also tend to increase, as more number of devices must communicate with
each other. Moreover, increasing N implies reduced distances between the de-
vices, and therefore a reduction on the per-device communication overhead. As
the number of malicious implanted devices (γ) increases, the frequency of inter-
device communication increases so as to ensure timely and accurate identification
of malicious device readings before the scope of damage through such an attack
increases. The value of CC is considered to be the cost associated with the com-
munication delay between any two devices. Therefore, a large value of CC implies
that the distance between the two communicating devices is high, therefore lesser
frequency of inter-device communication will ascertain that on-device energy re-
sources are not rapidly depleted. CI is the cost associated with loss of system
resources owing to adversary presence γ. In order to reduce the effective cost, in
terms of F , incurred by the attack on the smart grid infrastructure, Equation 3.1
is differentiated with the resulting expression (given by Equation 3.2), equated to
zero:
TotalCost(C) =
−γCI
F 2
+
CC
N
(3.2)
As a result, an optimal frequency of inter-device communication is yielded so as to
both effectively detect the attacks and to avoid a drastic increase in the imposed
overhead on the system through repeated pattern exchange between the devices.
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This optimal frequency expression for the given scenario is given by:
F =
√
CI
CC
×N × γ (3.3)
The above equation provides the minimal value of F to attain a high level of
accuracy in attack detection with a minimum number of messages exchanged
between the SGI devices.
3.2.3 Multi-Objective Approach to Attack Detection
The cost ratio (α = CI
CC
) directly impacts the frequency of inter-device commu-
nication and hence the attack detection rate. Thus it is essential that the value
of α is optimized so that an ideal communication cost is achieved so as to both
efficiently identify attacks and to avoid a radical increase in the forced overhead on
the system due to regular pattern exchange between the devices. Hence the prob-
lem of achieving this tradeoff can be viewed as a multi-objective decision-making
problem. To achieve the optimal value of α we propose a fuzzy-based decision
making scheme and Werner compensation operator is adopted to aggregate the
two objectives to generate a compromise solution which is both compensatory and
Pareto-optimal.
3.2.4 Werners Operator
Werners [55] “fuzzy and” and “fuzzy or” are two compensatory operators used
in solving multi-objective problems. The operators have an advantage of being
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directly proportional to the compensation rate. In addition, they have produced
equitable results in existing applications. The compensatory “fuzzy and” and
“fuzzy or” operators introduced by Werners [55] combine the minimum and max-
imum operator respectively with the arithmetic mean. The combination of these
operators leads to enhanced results with respect to empirical data and allows com-
pensation between the membership values in the aggregated sets. Based on these
advantages we used Werners “fuzzy and” operator to achieve a trade-off between
the attack detection rate and cost of inter-device communication.
The “fuzzy and” operator is represented as [56]:
µand(µA(x), µB(x)) = γ ·min(µA(x), µB(x)) +
(1− γ)[µA(x) + µB(x)]
2
xǫX, γǫ[0, 1]
(3.4)
The “fuzzy or” operator is represented as [56]:
µOR(µA(x), µB(x)) = γ ·max(µA(x), µB(x)) +
(1− γ)[µA(x) + µB(x)]
2
xǫX, γǫ[0, 1]
(3.5)
For γ = 1 the “fuzzy and” becomes the minimum operator and the “fuzzy or”
behaves as the maximum operator. While for γ = 0 the arithmetic mean is
obtained for both operators [56].
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3.3 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy Logic is used to mathematically represent human reasoning by allowing
in-between values to be defined between logical evaluations such as true/false,
on/off, yes/no, etc. A fuzzy set forms the basic building block of fuzzy logic and
is considered to be an improvement over the mathematical set. For example the
temperature a cup of tea is known to fall in the range of 0 to 100 degree Cel-
sius. A cup of tea with temperature 70 degrees is considered hot (1) and a cup
of tea with a temperature of 20 degrees is considered cold (0) and therefore the
decision in both these cases is definite. However, a cup with a temperature of
50 degrees might be considered hot by some while others might take it to cold.
This uncertainty in classification is referred to as fuzziness. A fuzzy set enables
such classifications to be successfully carried out. This can generally be done by
allowing several or even infinite number of values between the set boundaries.
An example of such a set is the unit interval [0, 1], where an element which has
number 1 assigned to it belongs to the set and an element with number 0 assigned
to it does not belong to it. All the other elements are described by real numbers
between 0 and 1 corresponding to their membership in the set. The larger the
real number assigned to an element, the higher is its membership. A linguistic
variable is analogous to an algebraic variable with the difference that instead of
taking numbers as values it takes words or sentences as values.
The basic structure of a fuzzy inference system consists of three conceptual com-
ponents: a rule base, a database and a reasoning mechanism [57]. The rule base
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is a collection of fuzzy rules and the database is used to define the membership
functions in these fuzzy rules. Finally, the reasoning mechanism is used to derive
a conclusion based on inference from the rules. For our scheme we consider two
linguistic variables, namely Total Cost and Detection Rate. We are interested in
achieving a low total cost for a high detection rate. Our objective is to find the
optimal value of the cost ratio that will yield the best tradeoff between the two
parameters being investigated. To achieve this we define the following rule:
Rule: IF a solution X has low communication cost AND high attack detection
rate, THEN it is an optimal solution
The membership function for the frequency of communication between the attack
detection nodes is calculated based on the equation presented by Werners [55]:
Membership(Fi) = [
−1
maxF
(Fi −minF )] + 1 (3.6)
The membership function of attack detection rate is calculated based on the fol-
lowing equation suggested by Werners [55]:
Membership(DRi) =
1
maxDR
(DRi −minDR) (3.7)
The membership values for total cost and detection rate are computed in such a
way that we maximize the detection rate while minimizing the total cost.
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3.4 Results and Analysis
3.4.1 Simulation parameters
Simulations were performed to obtain an optimal value for α that will provide an
accepted level of communication rate while at the same time resulting in a high
detection rate. In Table 4, we provide the parameters selected for running the
simulations.
Parameter Value
Cost ratio(α) 0.1 to 1.0
Number of devices (N) 10 to 30
Number of Implant devices (γ) 0.25 to 1.0
Table 3.1: Simulation Parameters.
3.4.2 Simulation Results
The simulator for testing the effectiveness of the proposed fuzzy based scheme
was implemented in JAVA. The simulations were carried out for varying values of
γ and its effect on the detection rate was analyzed. In addition, the total number
of devices, N , was varied to study its effect on the detection rate and it was
found that for N = 10, 20 and 30 the results are almost identical and therefore
we only present results for N = 30.
In Tables 3.2 - 3.5, we present the membership values for the two parameters
(total cost and detection rate): MemF and MemDR, as well as the overall
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membership denoted by OM. For varying values of the cost ratio, the total cost
is calculated based on Equation 3.3.
It can be inferred from the obtained results that an increase in the number of im-
planted devices (γ) results in a higher cost of communication (F ) as the frequency
of communication is increased between the devices. However, increasing val-
ues of γ also result in better attack detection rate and thus higher MemDR values.
α F DR MemF MemDR OM
0.1 0.866025404 15.8113883 1 0 0.25
0.2 1.224744871 22.36067977 0.934507085 0.065492915 0.282746457
0.3 1.5 27.38612788 0.884252604 0.115747396 0.307873698
0.4 1.732050808 31.6227766 0.841886117 0.158113883 0.329056942
0.5 1.936491673 35.35533906 0.804560492 0.195439508 0.347719754
0.6 2.121320344 38.72983346 0.770815548 0.229184452 0.364592226
0.7 2.291287847 41.83300133 0.73978387 0.26021613 0.380108065
0.8 2.449489743 44.72135955 0.710900288 0.289099712 0.394549856
0.9 2.598076211 47.4341649 0.683772234 0.316227766 0.408113883
1.0 2.738612788 50 0.658113883 0.341886117 0.420943058
Table 3.2: Simulation Results for N = 20 and γ = 0.25.
It can be observed from Table 3.2 that maximum overall membership is obtained
at a cost ratio (α = 1.0). Although we achieve a high detection rate of 50, this
high detection rate is obtained for a high level of cost ratio. This implies that
when there are a few number of malicious devices as compared to the number of
normally behaving devices it is difficult for the proposed scheme to differentiate
between the two. Hence to achieve a large detection rate the scheme needs to
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monitor a larger number of communications between the devices.
α F DR MemF MemDR OM
0.1 1.224744871 22.36067977 0.934507085 0.065492915 0.282746457
0.2 1.732050808 31.6227766 0.841886117 0.158113883 0.329056942
0.3 2.121320344 38.72983346 0.770815548 0.229184452 0.364592226
0.4 2.449489743 44.72135955 0.710900288 0.289099712 0.394549856
0.5 2.738612788 50 0.658113883 0.341886117 0.420943058
0.6 3 54.77225575 0.610391326 0.389608674 0.444804337
0.7 3.240370349 59.16079783 0.566505905 0.433494095 0.466747048
0.8 3.464101615 63.2455532 0.525658351 0.474341649 0.487170825
0.9 3.674234614 67.08203932 0.48729349 0.51270651 0.493646745
1.0 3.872983346 70.71067812 0.451007102 0.548992898 0.475503551
Table 3.3: Simulation Results for N = 20 and γ = 0.5.
As the number of implanted devices is raised from 0.225 to 0.5 there is an im-
provement in the overall membership from 43% to 49%. However the cost ratio is
still high at 0.9. This again indicates that higher number of inter-device commu-
nications are needed for effectively detecting attacks.
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α F DR MemF MemDR OM
0.1 1.5 27.38612788 0.884252604 0.115747396 0.307873698
0.2 2.121320344 38.72983346 0.770815548 0.229184452 0.364592226
0.3 2.598076211 47.4341649 0.683772234 0.316227766 0.408113883
0.4 3 54.77225575 0.610391326 0.389608674 0.444804337
0.5 3.354101966 61.23724357 0.545741447 0.454258553 0.477129276
0.6 3.674234614 67.08203932 0.48729349 0.51270651 0.493646745
0.7 3.968626967 72.45688373 0.433545046 0.566454954 0.466772523
0.8 4.242640687 77.45966692 0.383517214 0.616482786 0.441758607
0.9 4.5 82.15838363 0.336530047 0.663469953 0.418265023
1.0 4.74341649 86.60254038 0.292088479 0.707911521 0.39604424
Table 3.4: Simulation Results for N = 20 and γ = 0.75.
For γ = 0.75 we observe a much better cost ratio as compared to the first two
cases. The same overall membership is achieved for γ = 0.75 as is achieved with
γ = 0.5 with a much lower cost ratio of 0.6. This implies that as the number
of implanted devices in the network outnumber the normally behaving devices a
higher detection rate is achieved by observing fewer communications.
68
α F DR MemF MemDR OM
0.1 1.732050808 31.6227766 0.841886117 0.158113883 0.329056942
0.2 2.449489743 44.72135955 0.710900288 0.289099712 0.394549856
0.3 3 54.77225575 0.610391326 0.389608674 0.444804337
0.4 3.464101615 63.2455532 0.525658351 0.474341649 0.487170825
0.5 3.872983346 70.71067812 0.451007102 0.548992898 0.475503551
0.6 4.242640687 77.45966692 0.383517214 0.616482786 0.441758607
0.7 4.582575695 83.66600265 0.321453856 0.678546144 0.410726928
0.8 4.898979486 89.4427191 0.263686692 0.736313308 0.381843346
0.9 5.196152423 94.86832981 0.209430585 0.790569415 0.354715292
1.0 5.477225575 100 0.158113883 0.841886117 0.329056942
Table 3.5: Simulation Results for N = 20 and γ = 1.
The analysis from previous table is further confirmed in Table 3.5 as we can ob-
serve we achieve a high detection rate of 63% for a relatively cost ratio of 0.4.
Although the detection rate for γ = 1 is slightly less than that for γ = 0.75 we
achieve this tradeoff for a much lower cost ratio.
To meet the objective of the optimization problem we locate the highest value of
OM in Tables 3.2 - 3.5. It can be observed that for lower values of γ (=0.25, 0.5),
it is preferable to use a higher value of α, equal to 1. This implies that higher
total cost needs to be detected to achieve a reasonably higher detection rate. For
example, γ = 0.5, α = 1.0 yields a detection rate of nearly 71%.
For networks with larger number of implant devices (γ), higher values of overall
membership are achieved with relatively lower cost ratios. For example, γ = 0.5,
α = 0.9 yields a detection rate of nearly 50%. It can be inferred from the above
tables that as the intensity of rogue devices (γ) in the network is increased the
69
frequency of communication among devices increases and thus does the commu-
nication cost. This enables an acceptable detection rate to be achieved before the
scope of the damage through an attack increases and because this detection rate
is achieved at a lower α implies that the attack is detected well before the end of
the time window.
In this chapter we proposed a noble approach based on fuzzy logic for multi-
objective optimization between the two parameters involved in the detection
scheme for detecting device implant attacks, namely, Cost of Communication and
Attack Detection rate, by varying the value of the cost ratio (α). From experi-
mental results obtained it can be concluded that the best value for α lies between
0.4 and 0.6 for all combinations of parameter values tested.
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CHAPTER 4
SMART GRID DEVICE
BEHAVIOR DATASET
The lack of accurate data about current smart grid system deployments means
that researchers may make inaccurate assumptions which may lead to incorrect
results. Therefore, we propose a dataset in this section that models the attacks
against the home area network of the SGI, through definition and generation of
routine device behaviors. Any observed deviation from the defined normal profile
is labeled as a malicious attack. We merge the normal behavior data samples with
randomly generated malicious device behavior data, to form a dataset. The label-
ing of data samples is done through the definition of distinct rules. The malicious
data samples are generated based on the premise that implanted hoax devices or
compromised appliances of a home area network (HAN) are capable of generating
malicious electricity utilization data for subsequent delivery to the smart meter,
thereby resulting in incorrect electricity usage bill of a client. The generated
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dataset will alow us to accurately model the device implant attack for the smart
grid. Subsequently, we propose the use of intelligent schemes like Support Vector
machine (SVM) and Self-Organizing Map (SOM) for facilitating classification of
the generated SGI data into either the normal class or the anomalous class.
4.1 Dataset Generation
A dataset is modeled based on the operating patterns of home appliances in a
typical household network of the smart grid infrastructure. The modeled dataset
consists of 108,000 data samples. Each data sample in turn consists of 10 appli-
ances, each of which is represented by three parameters (features). These features
include device id, randomly generated energy values belonging to device operation
during a given time frame of a day, and a difference category. Table 4.1 presents
the power ratings for typical household devices that we have considered for our
work.
Device Power Rating (Watts)
Air Conditioning 1500
100 Watt bulbs 100
Microwave Oven 1700
Dish Washer 1000
Washing Machine 1000
Kettle 3000
Iron 2000
Desktop PC 300
Laptop 100
Television 600
Table 4.1: Power Ratings for Common Household Devices.
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In addition, each data sample also consists of a label to classify the data sample
as either normal (representing routine home network operations), or anomalous,
based on the extremity in the readings (too high or too low), when observed col-
lectively. Table 4.2 highlights the normal energy consumption in Kwh for devices
listed in Table 4.1. The formula for estimating energy consumption is provided in
Equation 4.1
DailyEnergyConsumption(kWh) =
Wattage×HoursUsedPerDay
1000
(4.1)
Device Power Rating (Watts) Energy Consumption(kWh)
Air Conditioning 1500 1.5
100 Watt bulbs 100 0.06
Microwave Oven 1700 1.7
Dish Washer 1000 1
Washing Machine 1000 1
Kettle 3000 3
Iron 2000 2
Desktop PC 300 0.3
Laptop 100 0.1
Television 600 0.6
Table 4.2: Energy Consumption (kWh) of Home Appliances.
It may be noted that not all appliances/devices are active during all time frames
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of a day. Therefore, we intuitively describe a combination of devices that are si-
multaneously active during any given time interval of a particular day. The overall
energy consumption during an interval is taken as the aggregated sum of energy
consumed by all active devices.
Random values are generated for each device identified as being active during a
time interval. An inactive device is given an energy feature value of 0 which in-
dicates a dont care, and this value is ignored during determination of the sample
class. The randomly generated energy values are then compared with the esti-
mated normal energy consumption values in Table 4.1 and a label is assigned to
each device. The label assigned may be extreme, marginal or medium, based on
the difference between the two energy values (expected and actual):
 Marginal, if the difference is ≤ 15%,
 Medium, if difference is between 15% - 35%, and
 Extreme, if the difference is ≥ 35%.
This criterion is applied to all dataset samples and the labels assigned are then
later used to classify each row as either normal or anomalous.
A device is known to behave normally if it is labeled as either marginal or medium
in the previous step. As such, percentages of devices are used for defining a
particular dataset sample. A total of 5 datasets were thus generated based on the
criteria for labeling the dataset samples. For example, one dataset that was used
in our experiments had samples labeled as normal if 25% (4 out of 10) devices
exhibited normal energy values, and was labeled as an attack instance otherwise.
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Table 4.3 highlights the distribution of normal and attack instances in the dataset
variants used for our simulations.
Dataset Type Normal Rows Attack Rows
25% 79036 28964
35% 79017 28983
45% 76884 31116
55% 43443 64557
65% 39834 68166
Table 4.3: Basic Dataset Characteristics.
A snapshot of several data samples for the 25% dataset is presented in Table 4.4.
The data rows presented are in the normalized form where each device reading is
labeled as either 51 (marginal), 52(medium) or 53 (extreme). The entire row is
either tagged as 50 (normal) or as 100(attack). It can observed from Table 4.4
that device 4 (dishwasher) is only active at 07:00 am and therefore has a random
energy value of 0.54 generated for it. The device is assigned a label of 53 for
this time slot as the randomly generated energy of 0.54 kWh is different from the
actual power rating of 1 kWh by more than 35%. The device is assigned value
0 for all other time slots indicating that the device is probably not in use during
the other time slots. In addition it can be inferred that the data row for 06:00
am is labeled as an attack (100) because 3 out of 3 active devices are labeled
as extreme (53). It is important to note that when assigning an overall label
to a row only active devices are monitored for their labels while devices which
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are inactive during that time slot (i.e., have label 0 assigned to them) do not
contribute towards determining the data row label.
06:00 1 0.97 53 2 0 0 3 0.61 53 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0.7 53 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 100
07:00 1 1.44 51 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0.54 53 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 0 9 0.1 51 10 0 0 50
08:00 1 1.25 52 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 2.59 51 7 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0.54 51 50
09:00 1 1.11 52 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0.16 53 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 50
10:00 1 0.54 53 2 0 0 3 1.22 52 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0.41 52 50
11:00 1 0.22 53 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0.17 53 100
12:00 1 1.03 52 2 0 0 3 0.23 53 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0.47 53 7 0 0 8 0.26 51 9 0 0 10 0 0 50
13:00 1 0.8 53 2 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 0.86 53 8 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 100
Table 4.4: Sample Dataset Rows.
It can be concluded from Table 4.3 that most datasets are imbalanced in favor
of either class. This implies that the identification accuracy of the model will
be affected since the learning algorithm will encounter more samples from the
dominant class of the dataset in question. For instance, the 65% dataset is heavily
biased towards the attack class with nearly twice as many attack rows as the
normal rows. In order to minimize the effect of the bias, the 55% dataset is
identified as the best dataset out of the five generated since it has the lowest
imbalance between the two classes. Although, the dataset may not ideally reflect
existing real Smart Grid networks, we believe it still can be applied as an effective
testbed to help researchers compare different intrusion detection methods for the
Smart Grid.
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4.2 UMass Smart* dataset
The UMass Smart* dataset is a part of the Smart* project [58] and is composed of
power measurements and heterogeneous sensory information collected by sensors
installed in 3 real households. The dataset contains information about home elec-
tricity usage parameters such as average household electricity usage every second,
as well as electricity usage at each circuit and nearly every plug load, electric-
ity generation data from on-site solar panels and wind turbines, outdoor weather
data, temperature and humidity data in indoor rooms, and, finally, data for a
range of important binary events, e.g., at wall switches, the HVAC system, doors,
and from motion sensors.
The UMass Smart* dataset consists of 44640 data samples and each sample is com-
posed of 17 features, namely, TimestampUTC, insideTemp, insideHumidity, out-
sideTemp, windChill, intervalAvgWindChill, outsideHumidity, apparentTempF,
windDirection, windDirectionDegrees, windSpeed, intervalAvgWindSpeed, wind-
GustDirectionDegrees, rainRate, dailyRain, dailyRainMM and class.
One apparent difference between the proposed dataset and the Smart* dataset is
the number of parameters monitored by a single device. In the proposed dataset
the only attribute assigned to a device is the randomly generated power level
at which the device operates and the device is tagged as normal or malicious
accordingly. On the other the Smart* dataset monitors 17 different parameters.
77
Dataset Type Normal Rows Attack Rows
25% 24187 23350
35% 22329 22311
45% 22408 22232
55% 22482 22158
65% 22376 22264
Table 4.5: Basic Smart* Dataset Characteristics.
A major drawback of the Smart* dataset is that the data samples are unlabeled.
As such all samples are assumed to exhibit normal behaviour. To introduce
anomalous samples into the dataset in order to make it consistent with the pro-
posed datasets varying number of features of the Smart* dataset were modified
and datasets similar to Table 4.3 were obtained. Basic characteristics of the mod-
ified Smart* datasets are presented in Table 4.5.
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CHAPTER 5
SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE
(SVM) BASED SG INTRUSION
DETECTION
A Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine learning system that
has been widely used for intrusion detection. In this chapter we describe the
application of support vector machine to the detection of attacks at the HAN
level of Smart Grid hierarchy. We employ SVM due to its good generalization
ability of the learning model. This implies that good accuracy can be achieved
even with relatively smaller training datasets when SVM is used for classification.
Another advantage of SVM is its ability to handle a large number of features. In
addition SVM also also ensures high accuracy for classification of future data from
the same allotment to which the training data belongs [59]. Experimental results
obtained confirm high accuracy of attack detection and insignificant false positive
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rates for our proposed approach.
5.1 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Support vector machines (SVMs)[59] are supervised knowledge based systems that
project the input vectors in feature space of large dimensions, assigning each vector
a label. SVMs categorize data by defining a group of support vectors that belong
to the set of training inputs that outline a hyper plane in the feature space [60].
SVMs have been used for both two-class and multi-class classification.
5.1.1 Two-Class Classification
In order to classify a two-class linearly separable data, SVM creates a hyperplane
that separates the binary classes of the the specified dataset with the largest
margin that provides best generalization ability [59]. Generalization ability is the
ability of the classifier to ensure classification accuracy on training data as well
as accuracy in classifying future data. A margin is used to decide the degree of
separation between two classes. Figure 5.1 illustrates an optimal hyperplane for a
two-class classification, where two different classes are represented: normal class
(circles) and attack class (squares).
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Figure 5.1: Optimal hyperplane for a two-class input space.
The aim of SVM here is to create a linear boundary (solid line) that expands
the margin (space between dashed lines) between the two different classes. The
data points that fall closest to the margin (shaded squares and circles) are known
as support vectors. The classifier is defined based on these support vectors. The
model presented in Figure 5.1 is only expected to work when the data that can
be linearly separated in the feature space.
Mathematically, the linear boundary can be expressed as [61]:
wTx+ b = 0 (5.1)
The classification problem using the training set can be estimated using a function
f : Rn 7→ {±1}. We present the normal class with x ∈ normal, y = 1 and the
attack class with x ∈ attack, y = −1; {xi, yi} ∈ R
nX{±1}. If the training data
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can be linearly separated then there exists a pair (w, b) ∈ RnXR such that
wTx+ b ≥ +1 for all x ∈ normal (5.2)
wTx+ b ≤ −1 for all x ∈ attack (5.3)
The decision function is given by
f(w, b)(x) = sign(w
Tx+ b) (5.4)
where w is the weight vector and b is the bias. The inequality constraints from
Equations 5.2 and 5.3 can be collectively represented as:
y(wTx+ b) ≥ 1 for all x ∈ (normal U attack) (5.5)
The aim of the classifier is to now to optimize the above by splitting the data with
the hyperplane that provides the largest margin. Therefore the learning problem
considering the constraints in Equation 5.5 can be formulated as:
minimize
1
2
∗ ‖ w ‖2 (5.6)
If SVM is unable to separate the binary classes, it uses a kernel function to plot
the input vectors into n-dimensional feature spaces. There are several available
choices for the kernel function including linear, polynomial, or Gaussian. The
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margin that splits the data points defines the number of parameters used by
SVMs. Hence SVMs do not involve any reduction in the number of features
and are free from the problem of over-fitting. Another major benefit of SVMs
is that the prospect of generalization errors is quite small. After classification is
completed, an appropriate optimization process can be applied for identification
of additional features if necessitated by the application [62].
5.1.2 Multi-Class Classification
Although, Support Vector Machines were initially meant to be used for classifi-
cation of two-class data (also known as binary classification), researches have re-
cently strived to extend the applicability of SVM to multi-class input space as well.
Presently, there exist two main SVM methodologies for classification of multi-class
data, namely, one-against-all and one-against-one methods [63]. The one-against-
all approach works by assembling and merging several binary classiers. On the
other hand, one-against-one formulates all data into one optimization problem.
Further details on multi-class classication can be obtained from [64].
5.2 Results and Analysis
In the proposed approach, each IDS at the HAN level will incorporate the SVM
scheme in order to detect attacks and stave off intrusions. All experiments were
carried out using the Weka Software [65]. The SVM algorithm is executed in two
phases: training phase and testing phase.
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5.2.1 Weka Tool
Weka [65] is a pool of several freely accesible data mining and machine learning
algorithms, including data pre-processing, grouping, and association rule extrac-
tion. It is an open source application written in Java that is freely available under
the GNU general public license agreement. It provides a graphical interface that
allows for quick set up and operation. The input to the Weka tool is in the form
of a flat file where each data object is described by a fixed number of attributes
that usually are of either alpha-numeric or numeric type.
5.2.2 Training
In the training phase the SVM algorithm is provided with the labeled input (i.e.,
first 70% data samples of the entire dataset). The output from this stage includes
the margin, the support vectors, the alpha values and the weights. For our data
samples, label 50 is assigned to a normal record and label 100 is assigned to an
attack record. At the end of this phase a training model for the data is obtained.
The training set is comprised of 75600 instances and each instance is defined by
31 attributes. Each instance is also labeled as either normal or attack and the
liner function is employed.
5.2.3 Testing
In the testing phase, we provide the test dataset (i.e., remaining 30% of data
samples in the dataset) without the class labels. This phase uses the classification
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model created at the end of the training phase. The results obtained from the
testing phase are presented in Table 5.1.
Parameter 25% 35% 45% 55% 65%
Instances 3240 3240 3240 3240 3240
Attributes 31 31 31 31 31
Detection Accuracy 90.929% 91.2809% 90.1173% 90.7037% 91.0123%
Table 5.1: SVM Testing Results.
It can be observed from Table 5.1 that SVM provides efficient classification of the
datasets with over 90% detection rate for every dataset.
Dataset a(normal) b(attack) % correct
25
22415 1264 94.7
1675 7046 80.8
35
22518 1266 94.7
1559 7057 81.9
45
21611 1413 93.9
1789 7587 80.9
55
11454 1604 87.7
1408 17934 92.7
65
10379 1532 87.1
1380 19109 93.3
Table 5.2: SVM Confusion Matrix.
The confusion matrix was calculated (Table 5.2) for each of the modeled dataset
and it can be observed that the true positive rate in detecting both normal and
attack samples is quite high for all datasets. For example, the top-left item in
the confusion matrix for the 25% dataset implies that 22415 of the confirmed
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“normal” test samples were predicted as “normal”. This implies that 94.7% of the
actual “normal” examples were recognized properly. Similar results are obtained
for the 35% and 45% datasets. However, from 55% dataset it can inferred that
the true positive rate for the normal samples reduces by a small margin while
the true positive rate for the attack samples shows a significant improvement. For
instance, the results for the 65% dataset indicate that 87.1% of the notmal samples
are identified correctly whereas 93.3% of attack rows are correctly identified as
attacks which is a improvement of more than 10% from the true positive rate
obtained for the 45% dataset.
Therefore, it can be concluded from the obtained results that as the number of
mailcious devices in the HAN level increases the propsed scheme is able to detect
these devices with high rate of accuracy while involving minimum overhead for
the detection scheme.
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CHAPTER 6
SELF-ORGANIZING MAP
(SOM) BASED ATTACK
DETECTION FOR SMART
GRID
The communications infrastructure of the SGI is prone to several malicious attacks
identified in the recent past. Customer-specific electricity readings are communi-
cated up the SGI hierarchy from consumer devices to centralized servers through
intermediary devices such as smart meters and data concentrators/aggregators. In
this chapter, we propose a Self-Organizing Map (SOM)-based approach towards
training and testing of centralized SGI devices to qualify them for identifying
anomalies accurately. The proposed scheme is capable of detecting anomalous
readings within a consumers household, with reasonable accuracies. SOM was
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used as an unsupervised learning algorithm [66] because of its simplicity and ef-
ficiency in classifying data. As compared with other learning techniques, SOMs
provide higher speed and faster conversion rates in processing real-time data that
is being regularly exchanged between different hierarchial levels in the Smart Grid.
6.1 Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs)
The Self-Organizing Maps proposed by Teuvo Kohonen, a professor at the
Academy of Finland, is a artificial neural network approach for evaluating and
envisioning n-dimensional data in significantly smaller magnitudes of 1 or 2 di-
mensions [67]. A SOM is trained using unsupervised learning, which implies that
no human intervention is required during the learning phase and that little knowl-
edge is essential about the features of the input data. SOMs have been applied to
a wide range of areas ranging from pattern recognition to image analysis as well
as intrusion detection.
6.1.1 The SOM Structure
A SOM structure is generally constructed by placing nodes (also called neurons)
in a two-dimensional grid or lattice called SOM map (see Figure 6.1). The neurons
in a SOM map can be organized in both matrix and hexagonal topology. In addi-
tion, each node i in the SOM map is linked to a n-dimensional weight vector, xi =
[xi1, xi2, ..., xin], where the dimension of n is identical to that of the input vectors.
The input layer to the the SOM is a collection of the vectors representing features
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of the problem under investigation. The output layer is the two-dimensional ar-
rangement of nodes that is directly related to the input layer [67].
Figure 6.1: Typical SOM Architecture.
At the end of the learning phase, similar nodes in the grid are clustered together
whereas dissimilar nodes are separated from each other. A neighborhood function
is used to determine the level of connectivity between the neurons. The most fre-
quently employed method to determine the neighborhood in SOM is the Gaussian
neighborhood approach.
6.1.2 Preprocessing
In the datasets proposed in Chapter 4 each data sample is defined by 32 features.
Out of the 32 features 31 features are used in this work as we remove the time-
stamp feature from the datasets as it does not contribute in the classification of
a sample. Since SOM can only deal with data in numeric format, alphanumeric
values in the dataset such as class label are enumerated to fit the training criteria.
A normal label is enumerated as 50 and an attack label is enumerated as 100. After
enumeration has been performed, normalization is then used to ensure that no
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single feature is more influential than any other feature in determing the training
result. Therefore, all dataset values are normalized to fall within the unit interval
[0,1]. The normalization is done using the root mean square (RMS) method.
6.1.3 SOM Training
The first step towards training the SOM is the initialization of weight vectors for
all the grid neurons. Generally the initialization can be done using any of the three
approaches, namely, random, sample or linear initialization. In all training itera-
tions, an input vector v is arbitrarily drawn from the training set and its match
with every weight vector in the SOM lattice is determined. A winner neuron or
the Best-Matching Unit (BMU) is chosen based on the level of similarity between
the neuron vector and the input vector. The most commonly used measure to de-
termine the similarity between the two vectors is the Euclidean distance. Thus, a
neuron that exhibits minimum distance to the input vector is chosen as the winner
neuron. The next step in the training phase is to minimize the distance from the
input vector to the BMU and its topological neighbors. All the neurons that fall
within the neighborhood of the BMU are updated while others are left unaltered.
The neighborhood radius is assigned a large value initially and then allowed to
decay exponentially in every iteration. This allows the map to be ordered globally.
The SOM map settles to a certain ’good fit’ state after all iterations (equal to the
number of data samples that were introduced), are completed.
Following are the steps involved in the SOM training algorithm [68]:
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 Step 1: Create a SOM weight matrix. The SOM map size and topology
are defined here.
 Step 2: Initialize the weights of all matrix nodes with randomly values in
the interval [0,1].
 Step 3: For every input vector v,
– 3.1 Compute the distance between the current input vector and the
weight vector of every node. The Euclidean distance between the vec-
tors is given as:
Dist =
√√√√ n∑
i=0
(vi − wi)2 (6.1)
Where v is the input vector representing the current input and weight
vector of the neuron is given by w.
– 3.2 Choose the winner node (BMU) as the neuron, such that the dis-
tance between the input vector and the neuron is smallest.
 Step 4: Update the weights of the winner neuron and all its adjacent nodes:
w(t+ 1) = w(t) + θ(t)× L(t)|V (t)− w(t)| (6.2)
where L(t) is defined as the learning rate, θ(t) is the neighborhood kernel
function centered on the winner unit, w(t) is current weight of the neu-
ron and w(t + 1) represents the updated weight. The amount by which
the weights of an input vector is adjusted is determined by θ(t) given by
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Equation 6.3.
θ(t) = exp
(
−
dist2
2σ2(t)
)
t = 1, 2, 3, ... (6.3)
Where dist is the distance of a node from the BMU and σ is the width of
the neighbourhood function as calculated by Equation 6.3.
 Step 5: Reduce the learning rate and the radius of the neighborhood. The
exponential decay function for the neighborhood is given below:
σ = σ0exp
(
−t
λ
)
t = 1, 2, 3, ... (6.4)
where σ0, indicates the width of the map at time t0, λ denotes a time
constant and t is the current iteration. The learning rate is also reduced
similarly.
 Step 6: Reiterate Steps (2)-(5) until the convergence condition is fulfilled.
In order to assign labels to SOM neurons we maintain a hit ratio between the
neuron and the training set row. After a neuron is selected as a winning neuron
it is tested against the training set to determine its class. If the neuron wins
for larger number of attack samples as compared to normal data samples, it is
classified as an attack, and as normal otherwise.
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6.1.4 SOM Testing
Once the ordered SOM structure is obtained from the training phase, the testing
is done as follows:
 Step 1: For each input vector compute the BMU based on the SOM map
obtained from training phase.
 Step 2: Classify the incoming vector as:
– Classify input vector as an normal if BMU is tagged as normal.
– Classify input vector as an attack if BMU is tagged as attack.
 Step 3: Also determine the accuracy of SOM using the following parame-
ters:
– True positive: An incoming vector is identified as attack or normal and
the BMU corresponds to this label respectively. For example an input
vector is classified as an attack and the BMU is labeled as an attack.
– False Positive: An incoming vector is identified as attack or normal but
the BMU label does not confirm this. For example, an input vector is
identified as normal but BMU is labeled as an attack.
6.2 Simulation Results
In the simulation tests, datasets modeled in Chapter 4 are used to determine the
accuracy of our proposed approach to accurately classify smart grid data into
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normal and anomalous. The testing of the SOM is conducted through the in-
troduction of unlabelled data samples to the SOM, and observation of the class
labels of the best matching nodes. The SOM is modeled as a rectangular matrix
of varying sizes. Random initialization is used to assign weights to the neuron vec-
tors. The training parameters selected for running the simulations are presented
in Table 6.1.
Initial L(t) 0.5
SOM Map size (Variable) 2 × 2 to 10 × 10
L(t) decay function Exponential
Training Iterations 75600
Neighborhood Function Gaussion
Topology Matrix
Table 6.1: SOM Training Parameters.
6.2.1 True Positives versus False Positives (Fixed Attack
to Normal Ratio)
Figures 6.2 - 6.7 present a comparison of the true positives and the false posi-
tives generated through simulation, for the five varying dataset labels. It can be
observed that varying the size of the SOM map has an effect on the detection
rate. It can be concluded from the results obtained that the dataset where 45%
of devices in a sample behave normally provides the best true positive rate and
this rate is achieved for a map size of 4 × 4. Also it can be noted that for almost
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all datasets the maximum true positives are reported for the 4 × 4 map size. For
a 25% ratio dataset, the highest detection rate was observed to be 57% at the
cost of 49% false positives. For larger map sizes, the false positives were found to
outweigh the detection rates. A similar trend was observed for the other datasets
tested. For the 25%, 35%, and the 45% datasets, a common trend observed was
of having the detection rate of a 5 × 5 map outperforming other map sizes. How-
ever, for the 55% and 65% datasets, the trend did not continue, and a consistent
detection rate of 40% was observed regardless of map size, for a constant set of
false positives of 60% generated.
Figure 6.2: TP VS FP with 25% ratio dataset.
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Figure 6.3: TP VS FP with 35% ratio dataset.
Figure 6.4: TP VS FP with 45% ratio dataset.
Figure 6.5: TP VS FP with 55% ratio dataset.
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The true and false rates remain nearly constant from 55% dataset onwards. There
is a slight decrease in the number of false positives and increase in the number of
true positives for a 55% dataset when a 10 × 10 map size is chosen.
Figure 6.6: TP VS FP with 65% ratio dataset.
The comparison of the 65% dataset to the 55% reveals a much larger percentage
of false positives for the 65% dataset. Also the true positives for the 65% dataset
are smaller. However, again like the 55% dataset the two measured parameters
remain constant for varying map sizes.
Figure 6.7: TP VS FP with 50% ratio dataset.
The two measured parameters remain identical for the 50% dataset.
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6.2.2 Execution Time
Figure 6.8: Execution time of SOM training for varying map sizes.
The size of the SOM has a direct impact on the delays incurred at time of train-
ing. In Figure 6.8, an illustration of the execution time for the SOM training for
varying map sizes is provided. It can be inferred that for map sizes of 5 × 5 and
below, the training time is less than 1000 seconds, whereas, for larger map sizes,
the time required to train the map for the same dataset is exceedingly high, with
9000 seconds being the peak value observed for a 10 × 10 map.
In this chapter, we proposed a SOM-based data clustering approach towards clas-
sification of the modeled smart grid data into normal or anomalous. The proposed
approach was subsequently tested for specific parameters and varying map sizes.
From the results obtained, our proposed approach was found to provide reason-
able accuracies of close to 60% when a map of size 5 × 5 was selected, for two
datasets. The overhead of the scheme was found to be relatively high for large
map sizes, but within bounds (< 1000 seconds) for smaller map sizes of 5 × 5 and
less.
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